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WHAT IS DIFFERENCE? THE EMERGENCE OF THE ARRIVANT 
69 
It would seem that there is an obvious difference between 'our' culture and 
'their/other' culture. In educational practice, it is important to appreciate other 
cultures and to cultivate tolerance of them, especially in the age of globalization. 
Therefore, the national curriculum needs to consider literature not only of our own 
culture but also of others. Ian Munday argues, however, that there is a problem in this 
understanding of difference: 
What is perhaps most significant about this distinction between an English 
Literary Heritage and texts from other cultures and traditions is that it assumes 
some kind of absolute distinction between these two categories (Munday, 2009). 
The reason why Munday argues that we cannot understand other cultures or traditions 
from the perspective of an absolute distinction between 'us' and 'them (not us)' is 
because this implies a desire to make otherness into a vehicle for understanding 
ourselves. Dividing the 'Orient' from the 'Occident' involves placing what is other to 
the Occident within the existing frame of the Occident. 
To overcome this situation, Munday argues that we must recognise the 'otherness' 
internal to language that is indicated by Jacques Derrida' s thought. Munday puts it 
like this: 
Meaning is not out there waiting to be worded. Rather, words as they come into 
being the world. Consequently, the signifier does not represent the signified, but 
brings it into 'presence'-brings it into being as an effect (Ibid.). 
Munday argues that '[ w ]ords/concepts differ as effects of language', therefore 'the 
binary distinction between a literary heritage and texts from other cultures' could be 
undermined. This understanding of language can also apply to the concept of 'truth' . 
'Truth as such is produced by language rather than anterior to it'. 
Following Derrida, Munday says 'all words are hunted/ haunted by other words 
internal to their very possibility of meaning anything' and this is 'the madness of 
language'. Munday emphasises that 'the iterability within language makes words 
other to themselves'. He argues that: 
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[T]he disorder/otherness internal to language ,that accompanies its iterability, in 
undermining the effects of presence, allows for the emergence of the arrivant 
(Ibid.). 
Munday maintains that the concept of truth is itself an effect of language/the mark. 
This means that the arbitrariness of words/contents demonstrates the uncontrollability 
of language. Munday criticises the binaristic thinking because it fails to make room 
for the unexpected or what is to come, that is to say, the arrivant. The approach or 
attitude of 'differance' is critical because it can undermine our grounded sense of 
what things mean, which sustains ordinary life. However, this is invariably what 'is' 
happening in our lives. 
According to Munday/Derrida, we can understand that language cannot be 
characterized by communication if that means the representation/reproduction of 
ideal/original meaning. Here, we need to understand that the act of writing is not 
about producing marks that stand in for what is fully present (in our mind) prior to the 
moment of writing. 
As a response to Munday's paper, I would like to scrutinize the moment of 
emergence of the arrivant, which could be understood as the emergence of 
strangeness or an otherness, in the light of Walter Benjamin's thought. According to 
Benjamin (1892-1940), experience in the very moment of writing cannot be separated 
from 'a chance event'. I think this is related with the ateleological aspects of teaching 
and learning. In regard to this, I would like to consider the moment of learning in 
terms of mimesis that Benjamin shows in his essay titled 'On the Mimetic Faculty'. 
THE MOMENT OF MIMESIS: EXPERIENCE IN THE MIDDEST OF 
AN EVENT 
In general, we can learn something new through imitating, or copying the existing 
models that embody the values of one's own society, culture and institution. This 
means that the act of imitation is understood in terms of representation or 
reproduction of the original models. In this sense, imitating is worthwhile for both the 
development of the individual and sustaining of existing society. Moreover, it seems 
that imitation is a voluntary action on the part of the individual who wishes to 
replicate the models that can play useful roles in her society. However, if we place too 
much emphasis on the outcome of imitation and the voluntary aspect of it, an accident 
or a chance event occurring in educational practice or learning related to the 
production of new meaning, will be missed. Whilst reconsidering what imitation 
involves, I would like to bring out the difference between mimesis and imitation/copy, 
and I shall scrutinize the former concept, especially concerning its involuntary aspect. 
In Poetics, Aristotle emphasises the importance of mimesis in terms of poiesis 
(creation). The limitations of this account of mimesis derive from the fact that is 
treated solely in terms of aesthetics. Therefore its educational implication, which 
Plato and Aristotle recognise, is missed. One of the reasons that the act of mimicked 
is considered inferior to the creation of something original is related to the 
appreciation of art; the value of art does not derive from its mimetic relationship to 
nature but from how the artist expresses himself. The origin of this 
distinction/hierarchy results from a reductive understanding of mimesis. 
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In 'On the Mimetic Faculty (1933)' Benjamin is deeply concerned with the 
mimetic gift that human beings possess. This gift enables us to connect the world that 
expresses the mystery of the universe. Benjamin demonstrates how the human 
mimetic gift (faculty) enters into writing and language. To understand his concept of 
mimesis, it is worth considering Benjamin's differentiation between 'sensuous 
similarity' and 'nonsensuous similarity'. The former is typified by onomatopoeia; the 
latter is represented by dance, cultic ritual and language. Benjamin gives careful 
attention to nonsensuous similarity. Nonsensuous similarity is produced not through 
the same medium-for instance, the sound of the blowing wind and of voices-but by 
the human body in its form or its movement. In relation to this point, Benjamin refers 
to the children's mimetic activities in playas a model for explaining the production of 
nonsensuous similarities. Nonsensuous similarity makes itself known in what we 
cannot acknowledge without medium, and, for example, is produced in the way in 
which the human body moves. In Benjamin's use of the term, 'mimesis' has no object 
to imitate. 
According to Benjamin, we can see two kinds of mimetic momentum: 
Nature produces similarities; one need only think of mimicry. The highest 
capacity for producing similarities, however, is man's. His gift for seeing 
similarity is nothing but a rudiment of the once powerful compulsion to become 
similar and to behave mimetically. There is perhaps not a single one of this higher 
functions in which his mimetic faculty does not play a decisive role (Benjamin, 
1933/1999, p. 720). 
Benjamin shows us two kinds of mimetic momentum: 'the gift for seeing similarities' 
and 'the gift for producing similarities'. The former is pure passiveness, thought of in 
terms of an event or the moment, that occurs ateleologically. The latter is a way of 
talking or writing about experience that denies representing or reproducing an original. 
Reconsidering mimesis in terms of the tension between pure passiveness and writing, 
we can see the involuntary aspect of imitation that inspires us to realize the 
ateleological moment. This moment drives learning and generates meaning in our 
lives. 
The moment in which'!, become similar to that which is other than 'me' is the 
condition of mimesis in relation to the gift of seeing similarity. At this moment, we 
cannot see the difference between an object of imitating and the imitator. Furthermore, 
this moment is an event that cannot be captured by intention or language. In this sense, 
mimesis in the gift of seeing that similarity is always already being invoked before we 
ask what is the aim of imitation, in other words, what is the aim of learning. Benjamin 
puts it like this: 
All form, every outline that man perceives, corresponds to something in him that 
enables him to reproduce it. The body imitates itself in the form of dance, the 
hand imitates and appropriates it through drawing. But this ability fins its limits in 
the world of color. The human body cannot produce color. It does relate to it not 
creatively but receptively: through the shimmering colors of vision (Benjamin, 
1926/1996, p. 442). 
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According to Benjamin, mimesis in the gift for seeing similarity finds its extreme case 
in mimesis for colour. This means that we are invaded by an event that we never think 
of meeting. Mimesis inevitably occurs without any.intention or ends. This moment 
can appear only when the gift for producing similarity is talking or writing it. Mimesis 
in the gift of seeing similarity is necessarily different from the moment itself because 
the moment of pure passiveness (the moment of ex-subject) always exceeds to the gift 
for producing similarity. 
A difference drives mimesis that produces similarity and generates a new meaning 
of the world. Mimesis that involves seeing similarity occurs involuntarily in a 
moment and mimesis in producing similarity brings this moment to our experience 
with differences. It seems that our seeing a similarity to imitate depends on chance. 
This involuntary aspect of imitation is related to learning as imitation. This provides 
one explanation for the fact that nobody knows what will be learnt by a learner. 
Learning driven by mimesis needs to be understood in terms of an accident or a 
chance, in Benjamin's sense. 
The moment of mimesis (learning) is a 'tiger-jump' that transforms both world 
and self. We cannot fully describe what is happening in the moment that what we call 
'learning' occurs. Various aims as regards teaching and learning will invariably be 
inscribed into the national curriculum and such aims will be oriented by national 
concerns. If we want to think about the ateleological moment of learning that is driven 
by difference, we need to try to describe what is happening in the very moment of 
learning. 
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